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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs, Tymeco Jones, Iesha Bullock, and Teairra 
Pizzarro, are certified nursing assistants who bring this action 
against their employer, SCO Silver Care Operations (“Silver 
Care”) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and related New Jersey state wage and hour laws.  
The plaintiffs claim that Silver Care underpaid them for 
overtime in two ways.  First, Silver Care failed to include 
certain hourly wage differentials in the calculation of the 
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plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, resulting in illegally low 
overtime rates.  Second, Silver Care deducted plaintiffs’ half-
hour meal breaks from their total hours worked, even though 
they often worked through those breaks.  A year after the 
plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, but before any discovery took 
place, Silver Care moved to dismiss or to stay the proceedings 
pending arbitration, citing the arbitration clause in the 
governing collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  The 
District Court denied the motion to dismiss or to stay pending 
arbitration.  Defendant Silver Care appeals, contending that 
both overtime claims must first be submitted to arbitration to 
resolve disputed interpretation of the CBA, including the 
definition of the wage differentials and policies concerning 
the meal breaks.  For the reasons set out below, we will 
affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
I.  Background  
 
 The plaintiffs are employed at an assisted living 
facility, which was bought by Silver Care in 2007.  The terms 
of their employment are governed by a CBA, negotiated by 
the nurses’ union at the time of the purchase in 2007.  This 
agreement lays out, among other things, wages, raises, breaks, 
and a grievance procedure that directs all disputes and 
complaints arising under the CBA to arbitration.  Together, 
the three plaintiffs bring underpayment of overtime claims on 
their own behalf and on behalf of a class of nursing assistants 
who have worked at the nursing home at any time between 
December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2013.  Their 
allegations are twofold:  First, though plaintiffs are paid wage 
differentials, an additional $1.25 an hour to $3.00 an hour to 
account for shift premiums and raises, these differentials are 
not included in their regular rate of pay when overtime pay is 
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calculated.  Second, plaintiffs’ 30-minute meal breaks are 
automatically deducted from total time worked even though 
they often need to work through those breaks during night 
shifts.  Briefly summarized below are the facts relevant to 
each of these two claims, followed by the procedural history. 
 
 A.  Exclusion of Wage Differentials in Overtime 
Calculation  
 
 Nursing assistants are paid a base rate of $10 to $14 an 
hour.  In addition to these base rates, they may also be paid 
some or all three types of differentials: (1) “shift 
differentials”—an additional $2.50 an hour or $3.00 an hour, 
depending on the time and day of the shift; (2) “raise 
differentials”—an additional $1.25 an hour to those who 
received a certain type of raise; and (3) “frills differentials”—
an additional $1.00 an hour or $1.60 an hour for nursing 
assistants who elected to forgo certain benefits.  Whereas 
nursing assistants are compensated for overtime at one and a 
half times their base rate plus frills differential, plaintiffs here 
allege, and have submitted paystubs to demonstrate, that the 
shift differentials and raise differentials are not included.  
Consequently, the plaintiffs contend that they are 
undercompensated for overtime, which should be at one and a 
half times their all-in hourly rate during the regular work 
period.   
 
  B.  Uncompensated 30-Minute Meal Breaks 
 
 Under the CBA, nursing assistants who are scheduled 
for eight-hour shifts are entitled to two paid 15-minute breaks 
and one unpaid 30-minute meal break per shift.  The plaintiffs 
allege that nursing assistants who work during the night shifts 
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“rarely, if ever” took an uninterrupted meal break because 
those shifts are chronically understaffed.1  For example, 
whereas each nursing assistant is typically responsible for 
twelve to seventeen patients during the day and evening 
shifts, a nursing assistant on a night shift would be 
responsible for around thirty patients.  In fact, the plaintiffs 
allege that, due to the staff shortage, the night shift 
supervisors do not schedule meal breaks for the night shift 
nursing assistants, and that when they do eat, they do so at the 
nurse’s station, rather than in the break room, in order to hear 
the call bell alerting them to patients requiring care.  Despite 
the frequent interruptions and restrictions, the plaintiffs allege 
that the 30-minute meal breaks are automatically deducted 
from their total hours worked.  Consequently, the plaintiffs 
allege that they are not being paid for all the hours worked, 
including overtime for those weeks in which they worked 
more than forty hours. 
 
 C.  Procedural History 
 
 The plaintiffs filed suit in December 2013.  Silver Care 
moved to dismiss the complaint, which motion was denied 
when the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.  Silver Care 
subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint, 
which was granted as to the plaintiffs’ claims seeking 
injunctive relief, but denied as to the claims seeking monetary 
damages.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved to conditionally 
certify their suit as a collective action.  Silver Care opposed 
the motion for conditional certification and moved to dismiss 
or to stay the proceedings pending arbitration.  The District 
Court granted conditional certification and denied Silver 
                                              
1 A 116.  
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Care’s motion to dismiss or stay proceedings pending 
arbitration, holding that the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims do not 
arise out of or implicate the CBA.  Silver Care subsequently 
moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.  Silver 
Care appealed.2  
 
II.  Discussion 
  
The main issue on appeal is the applicability of the 
arbitration clause in the CBA to each of the plaintiffs’ FLSA 
overtime claims.  We begin by examining the relevant legal 
framework before turning to the plaintiffs’ two claims. 
 
 A.  Legal Framework 
 
 Whether and when a plaintiff’s FLSA claims can be 
covered by an arbitration clause in a CBA is subject to a two-
prong test.  A court may compel arbitration of a plaintiff’s 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
to adjudicate the FLSA claims and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to 
consider the associated state law claims.  The District Court’s 
order denying Silver Care’s motion to dismiss or to stay 
pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3 is immediately 
appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). Arthur Anderson LLP 
v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 628 (2009).  Our review of the 
arbitrability of the plaintiffs’ claims is plenary.  See Edwards 
v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176 
(3d Cir. 1999)).  We review the District Court’s denial of the 
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 
F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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federal statutory claim when (1) the arbitration provision 
clearly and unmistakably waives the employee’s ability to 
vindicate his or her federal statutory right in court; and (2) the 
federal statute does not exclude arbitration as an appropriate 
forum.3  Even if no clear or unmistakable waiver exists, 
however, we have held that arbitration may still be compelled 
if the plaintiff’s FLSA claim “depends on the disputed 
interpretation of a CBA provision,” which dispute must “first 
go to arbitration—through the representative union—before 
[the employee may] vindicat[e] his or her rights in federal 
court under the FLSA.”4  We established this narrow rule to 
prevent a plaintiff from circumventing applicable statutes of 
limitations and contractually binding grievance procedures set 
out in a CBA.  Tellingly, we have applied it to dismiss a 
plaintiff’s FLSA claim in only one case, Vadino v. A. Valey 
Engineers.5   
 
 In Vadino, the plaintiff-employee brought two claims.6  
First, the plaintiff alleged that the employer breached the 
CBA by paying him less than the wages due to a journeyman 
under the CBA.7  Second, he alleged that the employer 
breached the overtime provision of the FLSA because he was 
not paid for overtime hours at one and a half times the 
journeyman rate to which he claimed that he was entitled 
under the CBA.8  In short, both claims centered on his 
                                              
3 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 260 (2009).   
4 Bell v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 733 F.3d 490, 494 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
5 903 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1990). 
6 Id. at 255. 
7 Id. at 257. 
8 Id.  
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argument that the CBA promised him higher wages than what 
he actually received.  Consequently, because his FLSA claim 
was “inevitably intertwined with the interpretation or 
application of [the] collective bargaining agreement,”9 we 
held that he must first resolve his contractual dispute 
according to the internal grievance procedure set out in the 
CBA.10  He could vindicate his federal statutory right in court 
only after resolution of his CBA claim.11 
  
 By contrast, we held more recently in Bell v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority that the 
plaintiffs were not required to resolve any contractual 
disputes through arbitration before bringing their FLSA claim 
in federal court because their FLSA claim was completely 
independent of any interpretation of the CBA.12  In that case, 
the plaintiffs, who worked as bus drivers and trolley 
operators, claimed that they should have been compensated 
for time spent performing vehicle inspections before the start 
of their daily trips.13  The defendant argued that this FLSA 
claim depended on “whether the provisions of the CBA 
governing compensation for reporting time prior to the start 
of daily schedules include payment for pre-trip inspections.”14  
That argument failed, however, because the employees did 
not claim that “they are entitled to additional payment under a 
CBA.”15  Rather, “resolution of the FLSA claim requires a 
                                              
9 Bell, 733 F.3d at 494 (describing Vadino). 
10 Vadino, 903 F.2d at 266. 
11 Id.   
12 Bell, 733 F.3d at 491. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 Id.  
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factual determination of the amount of time Operators are 
required to work prior to their scheduled start, and a legal 
determination regarding whether this time is (1) compensable 
and (2) subject to the overtime provisions of the FLSA.”16  
  
 In summary, to the extent that an employee may be 
compelled to arbitrate his or her FLSA claims at all, the 
arbitration clause in the CBA must clearly and unmistakably 
state so.  However, even where an arbitration clause does not 
contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of a plaintiff’s right 
to a judicial forum, a plaintiff may nonetheless be compelled 
to arbitrate disputes over interpretations of the CBA, if the 
FLSA claims depend on such contractual disputes.  
  
 Here, Silver Care does not dispute that the arbitration 
provision lacks a clear and unmistakable waiver of the 
employees’ right to vindicate their FLSA claims in federal 
court.17  Instead, Silver Care argues that this case must be 
stayed pending arbitration because both of the plaintiffs’ 
FLSA claims depend on disputed interpretations of the CBA.  
For the following reasons, we disagree. 
                                              
16 Id.  
17 In fact, the arbitration clause defines a grievance “as a 
dispute or complaint arising between the Union and the 
Employer under this CBA or the interpretation, application, 
performance or any alleged breach thereof.” A 189.  It does 
explicitly provide that “[a]ll claims that an employee has been 
discriminated against . . . in violation of applicable federal, 
state or local law shall be subject to the grievance and 
arbitration procedure as the sole and exclusive remedy for 
violations.”  A 191.  But there is no similar provision for 




  B.  Miscalculation of Overtime Rate Claim 
 
 Silver Care argues that the plaintiffs’ FLSA claim 
alleging miscalculation of the overtime rate rests upon a 
dispute over an implicit term of the CBA regarding whether 
the differentials already include a payment for overtime.  
Silver Care claims that during the collective bargaining 
process, when it negotiated to grandfather in some of the 
differentials, it also came to an agreement with the nurses’ 
union that the additional differential amounts would already 
include overtime.18  For example, Silver Care asserts that 
what appears to be a “$3.00 per hour weekend differential is a 
gross amount comprised of the $2.00 per hour differential and 
an extra $1.00 per hour in overtime premium . . . regardless of 
whether [the weekend shift] was worked in excess of 40 
hours per week.”19  This, Silver Care posits, constitutes a 
dispute over an implicit term of the CBA that must first be 
sent to arbitration before a court can decide whether the 
plaintiffs have a claim under the FLSA.20  
  
  Silver Care’s argument fails because the plaintiffs’ 
overtime claim is governed by the FLSA.  Unlike the dissent, 
we believe that the statute requires us to bypass how the CBA 
breaks down the pay differentials, and look only to whether 
these pay differentials fit into the statutory definition of 
remuneration that must be included in the calculation of an 
employee’s regular hourly rate of pay.  
 
                                              
18 Appellant’s Br. at 44.   
19 Id. at 41.   
20 Id. at 41-42.  
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 The FLSA requires qualifying employers to pay “at a 
rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” to 
employees for hours worked in excess of forty hours a 
week.21  The regular rate of pay is defined as “all 
remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the 
employee,” and the statute explicitly sets out a limited list of 
eight exceptions to this rule of “all remuneration.”22  We have 
held that these statutory exclusions are exclusive.  “[A]ll 
remuneration for employment paid which does not fall within 
one of these seven exclusionary clauses must be added into 
the total compensation received by the employee before his 
regular hourly rate of pay is [to be] determined.”23  
Furthermore, these statutory exclusions “are narrowly 
construed, and the employer bears the burden of establishing 
[that] an exemption [applies].”24  
 
 In other words, whether the wage differentials should 
be included in the regular rate of pay depends not on any 
labels assigned to them by the CBA, but on whether they fit 
into one of the statutory exclusions.  An employee’s “regular 
rate is a readily definable mathematical calculation that is 
explicitly controlled by the FLSA.”25  As the Supreme Court 
puts it, the regular rate “is not an arbitrary label chosen by the 
                                              
21 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).   
22 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). 
23 Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 
330 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 778.200(c)).  
24 Id. (quoting Minizza v. Stone Container Corp. Corrugated 
Container Div. E. Plant, 842 F.2d 1456, 1459 (3d Cir. 
1988) (internal citations omitted)). 
25 Id. (citing Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood 
Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424-45 (1945)).   
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parties; it is an actual fact.”26  Once amount of wages actually 
paid is known, “the determination of the regular rate becomes 
a matter of mathematical computation, the result of which is 
unaffected by any designation of a contrary ‘regular rate’ in 
the wage contracts.”27  Therefore, whether the CBA 
designates $2.00 of the $3.00 shift premium for working on 
Sunday as “regular pay” and $1.00 as “overtime” is 
completely irrelevant to a court’s analysis of the proper 
overtime payment owed to the plaintiffs.  A court determines 
the regular hourly rate of pay “by dividing [the employee’s] 
total remuneration for employment (except statutory 
exclusions) in any workweek by the total number of hours 
actually worked by him in that workweek for which such 
compensation was paid.”28  This calculation can be done 
simply by looking at a paystub. 
   
 In conclusion, the plaintiffs’ miscalculation of 
overtime rate claim does not depend on any disputed term of 
the CBA, and, therefore, need not be sent to arbitration. 
 
 C.  Lack of Mealtime Compensation Claim 
 
 Silver Care argues that the plaintiffs’ second FLSA 
claim—that their meal breaks should be credited towards 
hours worked—depends on disputed practices under the 
CBA, which must first be resolved by an arbitrator.29  
                                              
26 Walling, 325 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).   
27 Id. at 425.  
28 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. 
29 Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, the plaintiffs 
clearly state that their “claim for overtime wages due to 
unlawful meal break deductions is based only on their 
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Because we find that the alleged disputed practices 
enumerated by Silver Care are simply factual disputes, we 
hold that arbitration of the plaintiffs’ second claim is also not 
necessary. 
 
 The FLSA itself does not define what are compensable 
work hours.  Instead, the Wage and the Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor issued a number of regulations 
providing employers and employees alike guidance on how it 
would implement and enforce the law.  One such regulation 
provides that employers need not compensate employees for 
bona fide meal periods because those are not considered to be 
compensable worktime.30  The regulation defines a bona fide 
meal period as rest periods during which “[t]he employee 
must be completely relieved from duty for the purpose of 
eating regular meals,” but “[t]he employee is not relieved if 
he is required to perform any duties, whether active or 
inactive, while eating.”31 
   
 As the dissent alludes, this regulation does not have 
the force of law, however, and merely “constitute[s] a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
                                                                                                     
statutory rights under the FLSA.”  Appellees’ Br. at 17.  They 
emphasized that they ”do not claim that [Silver Care] 
breached a contractual right provided by the CBA but instead 
violated the FLSA and DOL regulations, which require 
employers to pay employees 1.5 times their regular rates for 
all hours worked in excess of 40 hours including meal breaks 
that are not bona fide.”  Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207; 29 C.F.R. 
§ 785.18) (emphasis in original).   
30 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). 
31 Id.  
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litigants may properly resort for guidance.”32  And we were 
so guided by it in Babcock v. Butler County, in which case we 
recognized that the FLSA does require employees to be 
compensated for meal periods if they are “primarily engaged 
in work-related duties during” those times, adopting the so-
called predominant benefit test.33  We explained that the 
“predominant benefit test is necessarily a fact-intensive 
inquiry,” where the “essential consideration . . . is whether the 
employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of 
eating a regularly scheduled meal.”34  Furthermore, one of the 
factors we look to, as part of this predominant benefit test, is 
the characterization of the mealtime break in the CBA.35  In 
short, Silver Care is subject to a statutory obligation to 
compensate the plaintiffs for time spent during meal periods 
if the plaintiffs, as they allege, are primarily engaged in work-
related duties during these breaks.  
 
 Silver Care does not argue that the plaintiffs’ mealtime 
compensation claim is a contractual dispute, as the dissent 
posits.  It recognizes that the plaintiffs’ mealtime 
compensation claim is based on the FLSA and how 
compensable work time is defined under that statute.  Instead, 
it relies on our consideration of the characterization of the 
meal break in the CBA in Babcock to support its contention 
that “[i]n order to determine . . . to whom the benefit of the 
meal break inures, there must be an interpretation of the 
                                              
32 Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 157 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)). 
33 Id. at 156. 
34 Id. at 157. 
35 Id. at 158.  
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CBA.”36  Among the disputed “interpretations” that Silver 
Care seeks to arbitrate are: (1) the actual length of the meal 
breaks—Silver Care alleges that different sections within the 
nursing home sometimes combine the unpaid meal break with 
the paid breaks, extending meal breaks to 45 minutes or an 
hour, for which only 30 minutes are unpaid;37 (2) “the 
practices, customs and usages of the parties with respect to 
what happens if an employee allegedly is interrupted during a 
meal break”38—whether the interrupted time is normally 
“considered part of the paid portion of the break or the unpaid 
portion of the break?;”39 and (3) practices under the CBA 
regarding the types of restrictions, if any, placed upon the 
employees during their meal breaks, “what are considered 
interruptions of the meal breaks, and how interruptions are 
handled during the meal breaks.”40   
 
 All of these so-called disputed “interpretations” of the 
CBA, however, are factual questions—length of meal breaks, 
types of interruptions, how they were handled, and whether 
the plaintiffs ever received compensation due to these 
interruptions.41  Silver Care cannot rely on Babcock to 
                                              
36 Appellant’s Br. at 48. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 49 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 50. 
41 Silver Care’s attempt to distinguish these inquiries from 
factual disputes is unpersuasive.  In its reply brief, Silver Care 
states that “making simple factual determinations of whether 
the meal break was interrupted and whether the employee 
worked during the meal break” is not sufficient, because 
“there first has to be a determination made, whether, if there 
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transform these factual disputes inherent to any FLSA claim 
into disputes over provisions of the CBA subject to 
arbitration.  
  
 In Babcock, we determined that the meal period at 
issue there inured primarily to the benefit of the employees by 
looking at both the facts and the CBA.42  First, we found that 
though the plaintiffs faced some restrictions during their meal 
breaks, “on balance, these restrictions did not predominantly 
benefit the employer,” particularly because the plaintiffs 
could “request authorization to leave [the workplace] for their 
meal period and could eat lunch away from their desks.”43  
Second, we separately considered the CBA, which we 
thought was favorable for the employer’s position, because 
the CBA “provide[d] corrections officers with the benefit of a 
partially-compensated mealtime and mandatory overtime pay 
if the mealtime is interrupted by work.”44  
  
 Notably, our consideration of the CBA was limited to 
reading the text.  We did not collapse the factual inquiry and 
the consideration of the CBA into one.  Nor could we.  To 
                                                                                                     
is an interruption, the interruption is considered part of the 
paid portion of the break or the unpaid portion of the meal 
break.”  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11.  Silver Care never 
makes clear why it matters to an FLSA claim how the CBA 
would categorize the meal time interruptions.  Either the 
plaintiffs received compensation for interruptions during their 
meal time, or they did not.  The plaintiffs’ claim is based on 
the FLSA rather than the CBA.   
42 Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158. 
43 Id. at 157. 
44 Id.  
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characterize an essentially factual inquiry as a dispute of 
practices or custom under the CBA such that arbitration is 
necessary would be to circumvent Supreme Court precedent 
that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate his or her 
federal statutory claims without a clear and unmistakable 
waiver.45   
 
 Here, Silver Care has not pointed to any disputes over 
the text of the CBA, which provides that “meal periods and 
breaks shall be free and uninterrupted, and employees shall 
not be on call.  However, in emergencies, employees are 
expected to respond.”46  Instead, Silver Care raises only 
disputes about what actually happens during these meal 
breaks.  Thus, Silver Care’s reliance on Babcock, to transform 
its factual disputes into contractual ones subject to the 
arbitration clause, is misplaced.   
 
* * * 
  
 In sum, neither of the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims depend 
on disputed interpretations of CBA provisions such that 
arbitration is necessary.47   
 
                                              
45 Pyett, 556 U.S. at 260. 
46 A 171.   
47 The plaintiffs also raised some threshold questions 
regarding whether the arbitration clause in the CBA is 
enforceable at all.  We need not address these questions 
because, even assuming the arbitration clause is enforceable, 
arbitration is inappropriate in this case where the plaintiffs’ 
FLSA claims do not depend upon any disputed interpretation 
of the CBA.   
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III.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Silver Care’s motion to dismiss or to stay 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 As I read the Majority’s opinion, it considers 
plaintiffs’ two claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”) (a pay-differentials claim and a meal-break 
claim) as independent from the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  Because I believe both of 
those claims rest on terms covered by the CBA, and because I 
believe our holding in Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 
253 (3d Cir. 1990), controls, they should first be arbitrated as 
the parties had agreed. 
 Vadino involved a union member challenging his pay 
rate and overtime compensation under the FLSA.  The 
relevant CBA between the union and Vadino’s employer set 
out various pay grades given the worker’s title and job 
qualifications.  Using that pay scale, Vadino argued that he 
was entitled to receive a higher wage and thus should have 
received overtime commensurate with it.  The CBA also 
provided for a grievance process that culminated in 
arbitration. 
 Although Vadino’s claim for overtime implicated the 
FLSA, we held that when a dispute arises “as to the correct 
wage rate under a [CBA]” that also involves a “claim under 
the overtime provision of the FLSA, the procedure we 
envision is to decide the contract interpretation issue through 
the grievance procedure to arbitration.”  Id. at 266.  
“Concurrent with that, the employee may bring a FLSA 
claim, but the FLSA overtime claim would be dependent 
upon the resolution . . . of the contract interpretation issue.”  
Id.  That holding applies to the case before us.    
 2 
 
 First, a central dispute between the parties involves the 
“correct wage rate” under the CBA: the pay differentials.  
Plaintiffs assert that the periodic increase in their weekly 
wages from the pay differentials was not reflected in their 
regular rate of pay for the purposes of calculating overtime.  
Silver Care, however, contends that overtime for those pay 
differentials was reflected in the pay differentials themselves 
(for example, under the implied terms of the CBA plaintiffs 
were not given the $3 per hour increase they received but 
rather a $2 per hour increase, and the extra dollar they 
received in wages was built-in overtime payment).  The 
parties clearly disagree as to what comprised those pay 
differentials and what was the correct pay-differential wage.  
I part ways with my colleagues that this dispute is 
“completely irrelevant to a court’s analysis of the proper 
overtime payment owed to the plaintiffs.”  If anything, what 
overtime is owed to plaintiffs depends on interpreting what 
the parties agreed regarding the breakdown of the pay 
differentials and what component of them is considered 
compensable wages for calculating overtime.  Under Vadino, 
that interpretation first should be made by an arbitrator per 
the arbitration provision in the CBA.  Because these claims 
involve disputed interpretations of the CBA, this case is not 
like Bell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority¸733 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 2013), in which we held that 
FLSA claims need not be arbitrated so long as they are 
completely independent of any interpretation of the applicable 
CBA. 
 Second, plaintiffs’ claim that they should be 
compensated for work performed during unpaid meal breaks 
also falls within the CBA.  The FLSA makes no mention of 
meal breaks.  Instead, the right to uninterrupted meal breaks 
is created by the CBA, providing that “meal periods and 
breaks shall be free and uninterrupted, and employees shall 
not be on call.  However, in emergencies, employees are 
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expected to respond.”  Plaintiffs argue that the unpaid, 
uninterrupted breaks to which they were entitled in the CBA 
were in fact interrupted and they should be compensated for 
the work performed during that time.  But their FLSA claim 
for compensation depends entirely on a breach-of-contract 
claim.  If Silver Care did not violate the terms of the CBA by 
interrupting their guaranteed unpaid breaks, there would be 
no cause of action for relief.  Thus the alleged breach of the 
CBA is a claim the parties agreed to arbitrate.   
 Furthermore, the text of the CBA is unclear as to what 
constitutes an interruption.  Would being understaffed, as 
plaintiffs allege, be an emergency under the CBA?  And if 
interrupted, could plaintiffs count that as one of their two 
interrupted breaks and take an uninterrupted break later?  
These questions go to the heart of what the parties intended 
when entering into the CBA.  Because this FLSA claim is 
predicated on a breach-of-contract claim that also warrants 
interpretation of the CBA, the parties’ arbitration agreement 
should be honored and the issue resolved by an arbitrator. 
 As the claims before us require in my view an 
interpretation of the CBA before proceeding to the alleged 
FLSA violations, and CBA interpretations require arbitration 
here, I respectfully dissent.    
